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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
Task five of the collaborative effort between ORNL, Brazil, and Westinghouse for 
the International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative entitled “Development of 
Advanced Instrumentation and Control for an Integrated Primary System 
Reactor” focuses on operator control and protection system interaction, with 
particular emphasis on developing emergency response guidelines (ERGs). As in 
the earlier tasks, we will use the IRIS plant as a specific example of an 
integrated primary system reactor (IPSR) design. The present state of the IRIS 
plant design – specifically, the lack of a detailed secondary system design – 
precludes establishing detailed emergency procedures at this time; however, we 
can create a structure for their eventual development. 
This report summarizes our progress to date. Section 1.2 describes the scope of 
this effort. Section 2 compares IPSR ERG development to the recent AP1000 
effort, and identifies three key plant differences that affect the ERGs and control 
room designs. The next three sections investigate these differences in more 
detail. Section 3 reviews the IRIS Safety-by-Design™ philosophy and its impact 
on the ERGs. Section 4 looks at differences between the IRIS and traditional 
loop PWR I&C Systems, and considers their implications for both control room 
design and ERG development. Section 5 examines the implications of having one 
operating staff control multiple reactor units. Section 6 provides sample IRIS 
emergency operating procedures (EOPs). Section 7 summarizes our conclusions. 
1.2. SCOPE 
The INERI contract scope of work task description for task 5, “operator control 
and protection system interaction,” is as follows: 
“Task Description 
“IPSRs are being designed as “hands-off” plants, with the 
control and protection systems designed to respond to all 
anticipated and accidental conditions postulated to occur 
during the plant lifetime. The main difference to current 
plants is that the operator will not be “required” to perform 
any function for the plant to initiate the automatic mitigation 
features. However, operator actions may improve the plant 
response, and a close monitoring of the plant systems 
operation will be vital to give the operator the option to take 
manual actions should the plant systems not perform as 
designed. Therefore, operator actions are credited in the plant 
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probabilistic safety assessment, and the Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA) is a critical component of the overall plant 
safety for IPSRs. 
“The differences in design characteristics and overall design 
philosophy between IPSRs and current LWRs makes the direct 
application of current LWR control room design features and 
emergency procedures guidelines (EPGs), the two being 
strongly connected, not optimal for IPSRs designs. The 
objective of this task is to develop a novel approach for IPSR 
control room design and emergency procedure guidelines 
development.” 
The following section taken from the original proposal (Reference 1) provides 
additional insight into the original intent of this task: 
“Operator interaction with control and protection systems 
“Part of this program aims at developing a methodology for 
defining both the plant emergency procedures and control 
room design issues at the design stage, using the Human 
Reliability Analysis developed for the probabilistic safety 
assessment. The methodology can make use of a recursive 
approach, which has a strong impact on HRA as well: every 
time new information about EPGs and Control Room design 
features are assumed, HRA results are updated and revised. 
This activity will be an important step in any new reactor 
development since a methodology able to define adequate 
emergency procedure guidance and Control Room features at 
an early design stage could be generally applicable. Thus, the 
EPGs, which will adopt a symptomatic approach common to 
other LWRs in the post-TMI environment, will be developed 
concurrently with the definition of the control room design, 
using the HRA as a common base. The plant emergency 
procedure guidelines will be developed using IRIS as a 
practical case study. Control Room requirements specific to 
IPSRs will be an explicit issue within this program. Although a 
complete design of the control room goes well beyond the 
scope of this program, a set of functional requirements for the 
control room will be developed. The overall process will 
provide the technical community with a possible approach for 
optimizing the operator interaction with the plant for 
advanced reactor concepts that present significant differences 
from the existing LWRs.” 
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The second year of the project focused on “establishing the main features of the 
EPGs and the control room for IPSRs, with particular emphasis on identifying 
differences and similarities with existing PWRs. The deliverable is a status report 
on the progress of this task at the end of the second year.” Revision 0 of this 
report serves as that deliverable. This year’s effort was to complete “the EPGs 
and control room characterization for IPSRs, including functional requirements, 
high level conceptual design, and design approach.” This revision provides the 
additional information. 
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2. EMERGENCY RESPONSE GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT 
The recent ERG development effort for the AP1000 provides a view of the current 
state of the art. Reference 2 summarizes the AP1000 process as follows: 
“The Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGs) have been developed for the 
AP1000. The generic ERGs for the low pressure1 reference PWR plant were 
used as the basic documents to develop the AP1000 ERGs. The AP1000 
design differences from the reference plant were reviewed and reflected in 
the process of developing operational steps in each ERG. The AP1000 
used PRA2 in both design and licensing. The provisions of the AP1000 PRA 
were also reviewed and incorporated into the ERGs. 
“Although the AP1000 design does not require operator action for the first 
72 hours after accidents, the operator actions with both safety-related and 
nonsafety-related equipment have an important role to mitigate the 
consequences of accidents.” 
Although the AP1000 featured passive safety systems while the reference plant 
did not, Reference 2 established functional correspondences between the 
AP1000 and reference plant systems. This had a significant effect on the AP1000 
ERG development process; specifically, reference 2 included the following 
observation: 
“Based on the comparison of the reference plant systems and the AP1000 
systems, the plants have similar functions, although in several cases the 
functions are performed by different systems. Since the reference plant 
and the AP1000 have similar basic system functions, the basic framework 
and recovery strategies contained in the reference plant ERGs generally 
apply to the AP1000.” 
The AP1000 ERG development process was an evolutionary one rather than a 
revolutionary one in the sense that the AP1000 ERGs relied heavily on those 
developed for the reference plant. Since most IPSRs in general (and IRIS 
specifically) are pressurized water reactors featuring passive safety systems, we 
might consider using the AP1000 as a reference plant for developing ERGs; 
however, the differences between IPSRs and AP1000 are greater than those 
between AP1000 and its reference plant. The weaker correspondence could 
                                       
1 In this context, “low pressure” means that the shutoff head of the reference plant’s safety 
injection system was lower than the normal primary system operating pressure. This term 
does not apply to either the AP1000 or the IRIS designs. 
2 PRA=probabilistic risk assessment. 
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require different recovery strategies for IPSRs, and perhaps even a different 
framework for presenting these strategies. 
In this paper, we use IRIS as a representative IPSR. IRIS employs a unique 
Safety-by-Design™ approach that makes it the most advanced of the current 
IPSR designs. Some of IRIS’ characteristics are proprietary, but there is 
sufficient information available in the public domain to explore the design 
impacts on the ERGs. Here we consider the following three major differences 
between IRIS and AP1000: 
1. IRIS uses “a ‘[S]afety-by-[D]esign[™]’ approach, which physically 
eliminates some accident sequences (e.g., large LOCA) and reduces 
the probability of occurrence or consequences of other serious 
design basis accidents. The IRIS safety-by-design approach can 
eliminate or reduce the probability or consequences of ANS 18.2 
[Reference 3] design basis accidents” (Reference 4, p. 1-9). 
2. IRIS features a hierarchical control system with a supervisory 
controller that oversees primary and secondary plant operations 
(much like the Temelín plant), while the AP1000 will use a flat 
control architecture similar to the one used on traditional 
Westinghouse PWRs. 
3. The vision for IRIS is for more than just a single-unit electric power 
generating station: it includes an expectation for multiple units on 
one site. Our vision for the IRIS control room is that barring 
regulatory or labor requirements to the contrary, one control room 
operating staff should be able to control multiple IRIS units. 
The vision for IRIS includes the possibility of coupling the plant with 
desalination, district heating, and industrial steam co-generation modules. 
Although this would require appropriate adjustments to the plant’s normal 
operating procedures, we foresee little impact on the nuclear ERGs. 
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3. COMPARISON OF IRIS AND AP1000 DESIGN-BASIS 
EVENTS 
The IRIS approach to safety focuses on achieving a design with innovative safety 
characteristics and multiple levels of defense for accident mitigation (defense-in-
depth), resulting in extremely low core damage probabilities while minimizing 
the occurrences of containment flooding, pressurization, and heat-up situations.  
The first line of defense in the IRIS defense-in-depth approach is to eliminate 
initiators that could eventually lead to core damage. This concept follows the 
Safety-by-Design™ approach, which involves designing the plant in such a way 
to prevent the accidents from occurring, rather than coping with their 
consequences. If it is not possible to eliminate the accidents altogether, then the 
design should inherently limit their consequences and/or their probability of 
occurring. The key difference from previous practice is that the integral reactor 
design is intrinsically conducive to eliminating accidents to a degree impossible 
in conventional loop-type reactors. The most easily visible of the safety potential 
characteristics of integral reactors is the elimination of the large LOCAs, since 
no large primary penetrations of the reactor vessel or large loop piping exist. 
Many others are possible by an appropriate design process that focuses on 
selecting the design characteristics that are most amenable to eliminating 
initiating events. The IRIS designers strived to achieve that focus. 
Like the AP1000, the IRIS design includes multiple levels of defense for a very 
wide range of plant events. The IRIS design provides for defense-in-depth (i.e., 
multiple barriers to radiation release) along with a multitude of individual plant 
features capable of providing ensuring plant safety. Some features follow 
practices common to older reactors, others bear similarities to the AP1000 
advanced designs, and some are exclusive features of IRIS. In all cases, the 
design goal is to always keep the core covered with water and avoid fuel damage. 
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) defines the accident analyses 
needed in light water reactor Safety Analysis Reports (Reference 5). The NRC 
made their last revision in 1978. Since there is no a-priori reason to believe that 
the specific accidents appropriate for 1970s-era designs remain appropriate, we 
reviewed the list to determine if it is necessary and sufficient for IRIS, and drew 
the following conclusions: 
1. The traditional high-level accident classification appears to be 
sufficient for defining IRIS accident categories. Reference 5 defines 
the following categories: increase in heat removal from the primary 
system, decrease in heat removal by the secondary system, 
decrease in reactor coolant flow rate, reactivity and power 
distribution anomalies, increase in reactor coolant inventory, 
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decrease in reactor coolant inventory, and radioactivity release from 
a system or component. 
2. The IRIS design does not appear to introduce any significant new 
accident categories beyond those listed item 1, but there are some 
new accidents to consider (e.g., inadvertent operation of the passive 
core cooling system during operation does not apply to traditional 
plants that lack this system). 
3. The NRC’s list of specific accidents has some hidden assumptions 
on the types of accidents that could result from a single failure; for 
example, it assumes that a single failure cannot lead to 
simultaneous opening of the feedwater and turbine bypass valves. 
The IRIS design basis should include specific requirements to 
ensure that any assumptions limiting the list of candidate 
accidents remain valid3. 
4. The IRIS design eliminates the possibility of some of the specific 
accidents listed in Reference 5. For example, IRIS uses shaftless 
reactor coolant pumps, so a reactor coolant pump shaft break 
cannot occur. 
Table 1 illustrates how specific IRIS design features influence the plant response 
to traditional PWR Condition IV events. Reference 6 provides additional details, 
as well as similar information for condition II and III events. That document also 
identified “those events for which a significant difference exists in IRIS versus 
passive PWRs.” Without repeating the details here, we found that IRIS is 
significantly different for the following: 
1. 13 out of 20 condition II events. 
2. 3 out of 10 condition III events. One of the unaffected events 
postulates an improperly loaded fuel assembly, and four of the 
remaining six involve auxiliary systems only, not the NSSS. 
3. 7 of 8 condition IV events. The IRIS design eliminates three of the 
events. The IRIS design does not affect the design basis fuel 
handling accident. 
Even without reviewing each event in detail, it is clear that there might be 
significant differences between the ERGs for IRIS and traditional passive loop-
type PWRs. This likely holds for other IPSRs as well. Table 2 lists the Emergency 
                                       
3 For example, “No credible single failure shall result in simultaneous occurrence of more than 
one of the following: (a) sustained control rod withdrawal, (b) sustained boron dilution, (c) 
excessive axial offset bank withdrawal or insertion, (d) sustained opening of any turbine 
bypass valve, (e) sustained excessive feedwater to any feedwater line, (f) sustained excessive 
opening of the turbine throttle valve.” 
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Operating Procedures (EOPs) developed for the AP1000 Simulator and then 
provides a preliminary assessment of how well each procedure might apply to 
IRIS. We can group the assessments into three broad categories: 
1. For 14 out of the 34 procedures, IRIS might have similar 
procedures that might differ in minor details, but essentially follow 
the same general approach. 
2. For 16 out of the 34 procedures, IRIS might have a procedure to 
accomplish similar goals but differences in the IRIS plant would 
require significantly different approaches than taken in the AP1000 
procedures. 
3. For 4 of the 34 procedures, the IRIS design eliminates the need for 
a corresponding IRIS procedure. 
This breakdown is somewhat misleading, since the 17 procedures in the second 
category account for roughly three-quarters of the total page count in the 
34 procedures, while the 13 procedures in the first category are generally quite 
short. We conclude that Emergency Response Guidelines and Emergency 
Operating Procedures for an IPSR such as IRIS would significantly differ in 
details from those existing for conventional loop-type PWRs. 
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Table 1: IRIS response to PWR Condition IV Events 
# Condition IV Design Basis Events IRIS Design Characteristic 
Results of IRIS Safety-by-
Design 
1 Large Break LOCA Integral RV Layout – No loop piping Eliminated by design 
2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
High design pressure once-




3 Steam System Piping Failure 
High design pressure SGs, 
piping, and isolation valves. SGs 
have small water inventory. 
Reduced probability, reduced 
consequences (limited 
containment effect, limited 
cooldown) or eliminated (no 
potential for return to power)  
4 Feedwater System Pipe Break 
High design pressure SGs, 
piping, and isolation valves. 
Integral RV has large primary 
water heat capacity. 
Reduced probability, reduced 
consequences  
5 Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break Spool pumps have no shaft Eliminated by design 
6 Reactor Coolant Pump Seizure 
No DNB for failure of 1 out of 8 
RCPs, even without Reactor 
Trip. 
Reduced consequences 
7 Spectrum of RCCA ejection accidents 
With internal CRDMs there is no 
ejection driving force Eliminated by design 
8 Design Basis Fuel Handling Accidents No IRIS specific design feature No impact 
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Table 2: AP1000 Emergency Operation Procedures: Application to IRIS 
# Title Summary IRIS Implications 
1 Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 
This procedure provides instructions 
to verify proper response of the 
automatic protection systems 
following manual or automatic 
actuation of a reactor trip or safety 
injection, to assess plant conditions, 
and to identify the appropriate 
recovery procedure. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be quite 
different to reflect the 
differences in the Engineered 
Safeguard Features and 
protection systems. 
2 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 
This procedure provides instructions 
to recover from a loss of reactor or 
secondary coolant. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be different to 
reflect the differences in the 
fluid systems (especially on 
the secondary side). 
3 Faulted SG Isolation 
This procedure provides instructions 
to identify and isolate a faulted 
steam generator. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be different to 
reflect the differences in the 
steam generator designs. 
4 SG Tube Rupture 
This procedure provides instructions 
to terminate leakage of reactor 
coolant into the secondary system 
following a steam generator tube 
rupture (SGTR). 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be quite 
different to reflect the 
differences in the steam 
generator and secondary 
system designs. The 
procedure for Faulted SG 
Isolation (see item 4) may be 
sufficient. 
5 LOCA Outside Containment 
This procedure provides instructions 
to isolate a LOCA outside 
containment. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure. 
6 Reactor Trip Response 
This procedure provides instructions 
to stabilize and control the plant 
following a reactor trip without a 
safety injection. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure. 
7 Natural Circulation Cooldown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to perform a natural circulation RCS 
cooldown and depressurization to 
cold shutdown, with no accident in 
progress, under requirements that 
will preclude any upper head void 
formation. 
IRIS could have a procedure 
for natural circulation 
cooldown but because of 
differences in the primary 
coolant loop and in the steam 
generators, the details would 
be rather different. 
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# Title Summary IRIS Implications 
8 Passive Safety System Termination 
This procedure provides instructions 
to terminate safety injection and 
stabilize plant conditions. 
IRIS could have a procedure 
to terminate passive safety 
systems operations (including 
termination following an 
inadvertent actuation), but 
because of the differences in 
the passive systems, the 
details would be quite 
different. 
9 Post LOCA Cooldown & Depressurization 
This procedure provides instructions 
to cool down and depressurize the 
RCS to cold shutdown conditions 
following a loss of reactor coolant 
inventory. 
IRIS could have a post-LOCA 
procedure but the details 





This procedure provides instructions 
to restore core cooling. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 
the details would be quite 
different. 
11 Response to Degraded Core Cooling 
This procedure provides instructions 
to restore adequate core cooling. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 
the details would be quite 
different. 
12 Response to Saturated Core Cooling 
This procedure provides instructions 
to restore subcooled core cooling. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure. 
13 Response to Loss of Heat Sink 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a loss of heat sink in 
all steam generators. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 
the details would be quite 
different. 
14 Response to SG Overpressure 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to an overpressure 
condition affecting either steam 
generator where pressure has 
increased above the highest safety 
valve set point. 
This IRIS design eliminates 
this possibility. 
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# Title Summary IRIS Implications 
15 Response to SG High Level 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a steam generator 
high-level condition and to address 
the steam generator overfill concern. 
IRIS could have a procedure 
to address steam generator 
overfilling, but the differences 
in the steam generators 
ensure that the details would 
be rather different. 
16 
Response to Loss of 
Normal Steam Release 
Capabilities 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a failure of the steam 
generator power operated relief 
valves (PORVs) and condenser 
steam dump valves. 
IRIS does not rely on steam 
release, so this procedure 
does not apply. 
17 Response to SG Low Level 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a steam generator low-
level condition. 
Because of differences in the 
steam generators, this 
procedure does not apply to 
IRIS. A "Response to Loss of 
Heat Sink" procedure (see 
item 13) is probably sufficient 
for IRIS. 
18 Response to High Pressurizer Level 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a high pressurizer 
level. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
19 Response to Low Pressurizer Level 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a low pressurizer level. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
20 Response to Voids in Reactor Vessel 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to voids in the reactor 
vessel head. 
This event does not apply to 
IRIS because the pressurizer 
lies within the reactor vessel. 
A "Response to Low 
Pressurizer Level" procedure 
(see item 19) would be 
sufficient. 
21 




This procedure provides instructions 
to avoid, or limit, thermal shock or 
pressurized thermal shock to the 
reactor pressure vessel, or 
overpressure conditions at low 
temperature. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 







This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a limited overcooling 
condition or to an overpressure 
condition at low temperature. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 
the details would be quite 
different. 
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# Title Summary IRIS Implications 
23 
Response to Nuclear 




This procedure provides instructions 
to add negative reactivity to a core 
which is observed to be critical when 
expected to be shut down. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the differences 
in the steam generators and 
Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems ensure that 
the details would be quite 
different. 
24 Response to Loss of Core Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to restore the core to an adequate 
shutdown condition. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be different to 
reflect the differences in the 
protection systems. 
25 Response to High Containment Pressure 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a high containment 
pressure. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
26 Response to Containment Flooding 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to containment flooding. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
27 Response to High Containment Radiation 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to high containment 
radiation level. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
28 Response to Low Containment Pressure 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to a low containment 
pressure. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
29 
Response to Loss of 
RCS Inventory During 
Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to maintain core cooling and 
protecting the reactor core in the 
event that PRZR level is lost during 
shutdown operations when the RCS 
is intact or RCS level is too low to 
support operation of the RNS pumps 
during operation in reduced 
inventory conditions in the RCS. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure but the details 
would need to be quite 
different to reflect the 
differences in the containment 
and Engineered Safeguard 
Features systems. 
30 
Response to Loss of 
RNS [residual heat 
removal system] 
During Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
for maintaining core cooling and 
protecting the reactor core in the 
event that residual heat removal 
system cooling is lost. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure. 
31 
Response to High 
Containment Radiation 
During Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to high radiation in 
containment. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
Revision 3  19 
 
Electronically approved records are authenticated in the Electronic Document Management System 




Flux During Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to increasing nuclear flux 
during shutdown. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
33 
Response to Cold 
Overpressure During 
Shutdown 
This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to an overpressure 
condition at low temperature. 







This procedure provides instructions 
to respond to unexpected changes 
in RCS temperature. 
IRIS could have a similar 
procedure 
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4. IRIS I&C SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
4.1. CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Although nuclear power plants must be able to handle safely emergency 
conditions, they exist to generate electricity, and most of the control room 
actions taken over plant life will focus on normal operations. The control room 
design must not focus solely on emergency operations; instead, it must facilitate 
normal operations as well. This requires coordinating the normal control system 
and control room designs. 
Although one can only speculate4 on what the final control system upgrade in 
the last operating IRIS plant may be a century or more from today, we can make 
some reasonable assumptions about what the initial architecture in the first 
IRIS unit will be a few years from now. Every indication is that the first IRIS 
units will use a distributed digital system networked to the control room, and 
that the control room will feature smart workstations. We will assume such an 
architecture in the remainder of this section. 
Reference 8 notes that “Early nuclear units had separate control systems for 
each control loop, and limited signal interaction between the loops. This 
simplified the design of each loop, particularly with analog control systems 
where each interconnection added hardware expense. The current trend is for 
more integrated systems that can take advantage of coordinating the different 
control loops.” The Temelín units in the Czech Republic are operating examples 
of power plants that utilize highly integrated control systems. The Temelín 
control systems provided the following features  
1. A “Control Coordinator” performs the supervisory control functions 
of (1) establishing the major plant reference signals (power, 
temperatures, pressures) during normal operation, and (2) 
establishing the operating mode for reactor and turbine control 
systems in response to operator requests and/or plant conditions 
(including upsets). Reference 8 describes a Control Coordinator for 
IRIS. 
2. A “Turbostep” function coordinates startup and shutdown of most 
secondary-side systems. The secondary-side systems, in turn, have 
their own sequential startup and shutdown algorithms. (Several 
                                       
4 Consider, for example, the possibility of developing intelligent, organic computers. This is not 
necessarily science fiction: reference 7 describes how the University of Florida is testing this 
technology by flying flight simulators on a laboratory scale.  
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primary auxiliary systems have sequential startup and shutdown 
algorithms as well). 
3. The Temelín control room provides online computerized procedure 
displays that (1) include live status information on the relevant 
plant variables for each step, and (2) in the case of normal (but not 
emergency) operating procedures, allow taking direct action from 
the procedures workstations. Reference 9 describes the system. 
The Temelín experience shows that, even in the past millennium, the technology 
existed to automate most if not all plant control operations, at least in the 
absence of equipment failure. Naturally, no utility would want to automate to 
the point of eliminating the entire operating staff, but it is clear that automation 
(1) can ease operator workload, and (2) should lead to more predictable actions 
than relying on manual control (particularly in timing, but one hopes also 
through reduction in error probability). The following list gives some of the items 
that one would probably not want to automate: 
1. Taking the reactor critical 
This is a simple operation with little associated risk of plant 
damage, so any benefits may not outweigh the cost. Forcing the 
operator to start the reactor manually forces him or her to monitor 
the plant during this time. Automating this task may be 
unacceptable to regulatory authorities. 
2. Issuing the command to synchronize to the grid 
Although one would want to automate the actual synchronization 
process, there needs to be an operator action to confirm that the 
grid dispatchers approve and expect the synchronization. 
3. Occasional simple tasks 
Some tasks do not warrant the added complexity of automation; for 
example, the Temelín system does not automate warming the 
moisture separator reheaters because the process takes several 
hours and requires very few manual actions. 
4. Long term accident recovery 
Because of the low probability of occurrence for severe accidents 
coupled with the low workload required for their long-term 
mitigation, long-term accident recovery actions probably do not 
warrant automation. 
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4.2. SAFETY SYSTEMS 
For better or worse, separating I&C systems into safety and non-safety systems 
is so ingrained in the regulatory process that we consider it unlikely that anyone 
would make the effort to propose, develop, and attempt to license a different 
approach. Separating safety systems from non-safety systems simplifies the 
rules for analyzing post-accident response, but sometimes fosters the belief that 
non-safety systems have no importance. Additional regulatory categories (e.g., 
systems important to safety) partially address this issue while adding ambiguity. 
From our perspective, we do not see a pressing need to deviate from existing 
regulatory practice. 
Separating I&C equipment into safety and non-safety systems presents an 
interface problem when the two systems have to communicate. The industry and 
its regulatory agencies have allowed sending isolated signals from the safety 
systems to non-safety systems for decades. With the advent of digital systems, 
the problem of integrating safety and non-safety systems onto common control 
room hardware arose. Control room designers have developed and licensed 
architectures that prevent failures in non-safety control room components from 
propagating to the safety systems, solving the problem. We hope that additional 
experience with digital systems will eventually allow complete elimination of all 
dedicated, hard-wired controls from the control room. 
4.3. CONTROL ROOM 
The control room equipment performs two basic functions. First, it provides the 
plant status information needed to let the operators make decisions on plant 
operations. Second, it provides a mechanism for executing the operator 
commands resulting from those decisions. In the old analog designs, the 
information displays consisted of hundreds of dedicated meters, lights, 
recorders, and similar devices, while the command entry mechanism consisted 
of hundreds of dedicated switches, potentiometers, and similar devices. Digital 
technology eliminated the need for large panels filled with dedicated 
presentations and controls, and replaced these with programmed displays that 
present the information in a synthesized, consistent, and more user friendly 
manner. We see no reason to avoid this technology. 
Our vision for an IRIS control room incorporates many ideas found in current 
advanced control room designs such as the AP1000 design. Nuclear suppliers 
developed and tested these ideas over several decades. Briefly, we see each 
operator having a work area that includes the following features: 
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1. Information displays 
Current display technology has size limits, so the current practice 
is to provide multiple displays for each user. We suggest the 
following minimum display set: 
A. A dedicated overview display 
Some current designs use a separate wall-mounted display 
for this purpose, but there is no need to separate the 
overview from the user’s work place5. The overview should 
provide high-level information on the area under the 
operators control and its major interfaces. 
B. Safety parameters display 
In principal, the overview display should provide this 
information, but regulatory requirements make it difficult or 
impossible to combine safety parameters with an operational 
overview. 
C. Alarm status display 
Modern alarm displays mimic traditional alarm windows, 
eliminating the old, user-hostile multi-page alarm lists. 
D. Procedure displays 
A key component of our vision is an on-line computerized 
procedure system that has the capability to suggest and 
execute commands. As noted earlier, these have existed for 
many years. 
E. Monitoring and command displays 
Modern I&C displays provide plant information in a graphical 
format. These graphics include on-screen buttons and 
controls. The operator can navigate through the display set to 
focus on the displays that best relate to his or her current 
attention. We recommend providing at least two displays for 
monitoring and command. 
                                       
5 Large wall mounted displays appear to be good choices for providing overview information to 
larger groups, but the idea that two operators cannot discuss plant status without using a 
separate wall mounted system is untenable. We see an application for wall-mounted displays 
in places such as the technical support center. 
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The user should have the ability to customize the display 
arrangement by determining which display serves each display 
function. 
2. Information entry devices 
We suggest a keyboard and a pointing device such as a mouse or 
trackball. 
3. Printer 
The operator should have a printer or similar device. Considering 
today’s prices, we see no need to share printers between operators. 
4. Communications 
Power plant operators do not have the high-volume communication 
requirements that one finds in, for example, air traffic controllers or 
railroad dispatchers, but at times, they need to communicate with 
others outside the control room. The operators should have a 
telephone/intercom system available. We do not recommend 
integrating this with the plant I&C System, although the analogous 
integration is common in other industries. 
Each connection between the plant I&C system and the general public creates a 
potential security risk, so we recommend limiting inputs to the plant I&C system 
to those directly related to plant operation (e.g., dispatcher requests). In 
particular, we recommend excluding email, web access, and other similar and 
perhaps important functions from the control room I&C displays, networks, and 
systems. The control room should have a separate system to provide these 
functions. 
The operator work area outlined here is a robust configuration suitable for 
several approaches to plant operation. In the traditional approach, plant 
operators control one unit (reactor, turbine, generator, and switchyard). A more 
restricted approach separates the nuclear unit control and the 
turbine/generator/switchyard control into separate operating staffs. A third 
possibility, discussed in Section 5, is to have one operating staff responsible for 
all nuclear units on the site. Regardless of the arrangement, the work area 
described here can accommodate the needs if the designers program the 
workstation computers accordingly. 
The control room’s location is another issue. In older units incorporating analog 
controls, technical limits required placing the control room near the controlled 
equipment. These limits do not apply to modern digital systems. Technology 
allows locating the control room anywhere (worldwide), but security and 
practical considerations suggest locating the control room in a protected area on 
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site6. If one dedicates an operating staff to each reactor, then collocation makes 
sense, but if one combines functions in a site operating staff, then having a 
common room for controlling all units on site makes more sense. 
Current regulations require some form of emergency shutdown facility. The 
technology exists to locate this anywhere as well. Although the regulations 
require only limited capability, it may be cheaper to duplicate the control room 
functionality than to develop a special, restricted-capability system. Duplicating 
the control room displays in the emergency shutdown facility has human factors 
advantages as well. The analog of the switchover from the main control room to 
the emergency shutdown facility is easily and commonly solved in other 
industries; however, the current regulations in the nuclear industry have not 
kept pace with the latest technology in this area. 
                                       
6 One should immediately not rule out the possibility of providing for off-site control, since it 
might offer some advantages in certain emergency conditions (e.g., nearby transportation 
accident with toxic chemical release). Security, not technology would be the limiting 
consideration. 
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5. MULTI-UNIT OPERATION 
Before developing procedures, we need to establish the characteristics of the 
operating staff expected to execute those procedures. The IRIS program 
considers allowing one operating crew to monitor multiple units. Traditionally, 
each commercial nuclear reactor had its own operating staff. Multi-unit 
operation by a single operating staff is common practice in many other 
industries, including non-nuclear electric power plant. We know of no technical 
reason why the normal practice cannot extend to nuclear power plant 
operations. 
This section develops example requirements to define the operating staff and 
some of their constraints. To provide specifics, we followed the approach given in 
Reference 10, which also served as a source for AP1000 staffing requirements.  
5.1. OPERATING STAFF REQUIREMENTS FOR MULTI-UNIT OPERATION 
This section establishes preliminary staffing constraints for operating a multi-
unit IRIS plant. The individuals identified in these requirements will carry out 
plant operations during normal and emergency operations. These requirements 
establish constraints on individual qualifications and define the locations within 
which each individual may act. These requirements provide for augmenting the 
minimum staffing to ensure that an adequate staff is available for emergencies 
and to ensure routine and administrative tasks do not distract the operators at 
the plant controls from the plant operation. The staffing requirements presented 
here may exceed those in current regulatory requirements in the sense that they 
may specify plant operability with a smaller crew than some regulatory agencies 
might allow. For example, the staffing specified for design purposes follows 
trends in other industries and may result in less than one operator per reactor. 
[IRIS.OpStaff.1] The normal shift operational staff for IRIS plants consisting of 
no more than three IRIS units shall not exceed the following: 
Normal Position License 
1 Shift Supervisor SRO 
1 Senior Reactor Operator SRO 
3 Reactor Operators RO 
1 Technical Advisor - 
2 Equipment Operators - 
1 Administrative Assistant - 
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Basis: This is equivalent to the operating staff for one AP1000 unit. 
We chose to write this requirement for three IRIS units 
because three IRIS units provide roughly the same electric 
power output as one AP1000. As a goal, we would like to have 
one operating staff operate up to six IRIS units. A utility may 
choose to use a larger staff (e.g., dedicating at least one 
Reactor Operator per unit), but our intent is that the workload 
imposed by the I&C System should not be the limiting factor 
leading to additional staffing. 
Guidance: One shift supervisor will be responsible for overall plant 
operation. This individual's normal station will be the shift 
supervisor's office; however, at any time the shift supervisor 
may be anywhere within the plant boundary. If so, the 
individual will be available (via voice communication) to 
respond immediately to the control room operators and if 
necessary, can be available in the controlling area of the main 
control room (MCR) within ten minutes. 
One Senior Reactor Operator will be responsible for the direct 
supervision of the operators in the MCR. This individual's 
normal station will be in the main controlling area of the 
MCR; however, at any time the individual may be anywhere in 
the MCR. 
Two Reactor Operators will be responsible for operating the 
controls in the MCR. These individuals will normally be 
located at the controls in the main controlling area of the 
MCR. One of these individuals (or another individual with an 
SRO or RO license) will be at the controls at all times. The 
other individual will be in the MCR at all times. 
A third Reactor Operator will be responsible to assist the 
operators in the controlling area of the MCR by interfacing 
with other members of the plant staff. This individual's 
normal location will be in an area immediately adjacent to the 
controlling area of the MCR; however, the individual may be 
anywhere within the plant boundary. If so, the individual will 
be available (via voice communication) to respond immediately 
to the control room operators and if necessary, can be 
available in the controlling area of the MCR within ten 
minutes. 
One Shift Technical Advisor qualified to provide engineering 
support will normally be located in an office immediately 
adjacent to the main controlling area of the MCR; however, 
the individual may be anywhere within the plant boundary. If 
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so, the individual will be available (via voice communication) 
to respond immediately to the control room operators and if 
necessary, can be available in the controlling area of the MCR 
within ten minutes. 
Two equipment operators will be qualified as necessary to 
operate equipment in the plant at local stations. These 
individuals will normally be at various locations throughout 
the plant as operations require. The equipment operators will 
be available via voice communication to respond immediately 
to commands from the control room operators. 
One Administrative Assistant will assist the shift supervisor 
with administrative details, e.g., obtaining references, 
handling correspondence, etc. This individual's normal 
location will be in or adjacent to the shift supervisor's office; 
however, the individual may be anywhere within the plant 
boundary. 
[IRIS.OpStaff.2] The control room design (e.g., layout, number, and design of 
workstations) shall support operation during emergencies by the following 
maximum crew complement in the main controlling area of the MCR: 
Normal Position License 
1 Shift Supervisor SRO 
1 Senior Reactor Operator SRO 
3 Reactor Operators RO 
1 Technical Advisor - 
2 Equipment Operators - 
 
Guidance: These people are a subset of the personnel listed in 
requirement [IRIS.OpStaff.1]. 
[IRIS.OpStaff.3] In addition to the maximum crew complement, the main 
controlling area of the MCR shall have provisions for three active observers 
and assistants. 
Guidance: The intent is that one individual is from the regulatory 
authority, one is from the plant owner's management, and one 
is to handle communications. 
5.2. OPERATOR ACTION REQUIREMENTS 
Automating plant operation is a primary I&C System function, and the required 
degree of automation depends on the constraints imposed on manual actions. 
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This section establishes preliminary operator action constraints for operating a 
multiunit IRIS plant. These requirements recognize that utilities normally 
perform advance planning for unit startups, so they allow for augmenting the 
staff for those activities. On the other hand, unit shutdowns can occur 
unexpectedly, so the design must allow a normal operating crew to handle these 
events without exceeding a reasonable workload for any member of the crew. 
Additional crew restrictions apply for shutdowns from outside the main control 
room. 
Requirements that state, "...a single licensed operator to adequately perform the 
control and monitoring functions..." only mean that one operator can perform all 
the control actions needed at the control workstations. When interpreting these 
requirements, assume that the remaining members of the plant operating staff 
are available for other duties (e.g., the Equipment Operators are available to 
assist at local control stations). 
[IRIS.OpActions.1] The I&C system shall allow performing all defined normal and 
emergency operations with the defined plant operating staff. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.1] The I&C System shall provide the necessary control and 
monitoring functions so that a normal shift crew can accomplish a single 
unit startup from cold shutdown to hot standby while monitoring the 
remaining units under their supervision. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.2] The I&C System shall provide the necessary control and 
monitoring functions so that a normal control room crew can accomplish 
multiple simultaneous unit startups from cold shutdown to hot standby 
while monitoring the remaining units under their control. 
Basis: Since one normally plans for startup from cold shutdown to 
hot standby in advance, it seems reasonable to allow for 
additional equipment operators so that each unit has a full 
complement. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.3] The I&C system shall provide for a single licensed 
operator to adequately perform the monitoring and control functions 
needed to bring one unit from a hot standby condition to full power. 
Basis: This allows one operator to devote attention to 
synchronization and power escalation. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.4] The I&C system shall provide for a single licensed 
operator to adequately perform the control and monitoring functions 
needed to maintain power operation of all units under his or her control. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.5] The I&C system shall provide for a single licensed 
operator to adequately perform the monitoring and control functions 
needed to take one or more of the plant units under his or her control 
from power operation to hot standby, while monitoring the remaining 
units under his or her control. 
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Exception: Remote shutdown operations for bringing the reactor from 
power operation to hot standby. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.6] The I&C System shall provide the necessary control and 
monitoring functions to allow two licensed operators (SRO or RO) and 
two EOs (only) to take any or all plant units under their control from 
power operation to hot standby from outside the main control room. 
Guidance: For subsequent operations, assume that a normal crew will be 
available. 
[IRIS.OpActions.1.7] The I&C System shall provide the necessary control and 
monitoring functions such that startup from the practical low-
temperature limit of cold shutdown (i.e., “cold iron”) to hot standby, and 
for shutdown from hot standby to “cold iron”, can be accomplished by 
the normal shift crew. 
[IRIS.OpActions.2] The I&C system design shall allow adequate time for the 
plant operating staff to perform their required duties. 
[IRIS.OpActions.2.1] The IRIS plant I&C System designer shall perform the 
analyses of plant transients and emergencies as part of the I&C System 
design process based on the following assumptions: 
 (a) At least one licensed operator will be in the controlling area of the 
MCR at all times during normal power operations, and will be available 
at the controls immediately to respond to any off-normal situation, 
 (b) Two additional licensed operators (at least one of which is an SRO) 
will be available in the controlling area of the MCR within one minute 
when called upon, 
 (c) Two equipment operators will be available via voice communication to 
respond immediately to commands from the control room operators, 
 (d) The shift supervisor, the shift technical advisor, and an additional RO 
will be available via voice communication to respond immediately to the 
control room operators and can be available in the controlling area of the 
MCR within ten minutes. 
[IRIS.OpActions.2.2] The IRIS plant shall require no credit for operator action 
to meet regulatory limits for at least 72 hours following the initiating 
events. 
[IRIS.OpActions.2.3] The time required before an operator must act in an 
emergency to meet non-regulatory limits shall not be less than 30 
minutes. 
[IRIS.OpActions.2.4] The IRIS plant I&C system shall not preclude operator 
actions during the 30-minute time. 
Guidance: The intent is that the I&C System must not lock out operator 
actions in a general sense. Locking out specific actions for 
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specific times and reasons (e.g., for a fixed time delay to allow 
an action to go to completion) is allowed. 
5.3. MULTI-UNIT ACCIDENTS 
Allowing one control room operating staff to control multiple IRIS units 
introduces the possibility that they would have to deal with simultaneous 
emergencies. The IRIS design does not require any operator action to meet 
regulatory limits for at least 72 hours following any initiating events, so there 
would be ample time to call in additional staff before exceeding regulatory limits. 
On the other hand, there may be desirable non-regulatory actions that would 
burden the operators, particularly if there were simultaneous events. To simplify 
the problem, we assume that the following combinations are sufficiently 
improbable that we can forego some or all non-regulatory actions until after 
calling in additional staff: 
1. A condition III or IV event combined with one or more additional 
condition II, III, or IV events. 
2. Simultaneous condition II events unless either (1) the event 
originates in shared equipment or (2) the events are causally 
connected (this includes any credible common mode failures). 
The design should consider the potential for taking non-regulatory action with 
certain failures, but there is no need to apply the stringent failure assumptions 
normally associated with plant safety analyses. If we review the events listed in 
References 6 and 5 and assume that the only relevant shared equipment is in 
the plant electrical system, we can make the following observations: 
1. Loss of offsite power would affect all units on the site. 
2. Loss of external electrical load could affect all units on the site 
simultaneously. 
3. Any condition II event in one unit that leads to a turbine trip could 
potentially introduce a switchyard electrical transient that would 
cause a loss of offsite power. 
4. Any condition II event in one unit that leads to a turbine trip could 
potentially introduce a switchyard electrical transient that would 
cause turbine-generator trips in the remaining units. 
5. Grid islanding would affect all units equally. It could also cause a 
loss of offsite power. 
6. Grid and switchyard transients will affect all units on the site. They 
could also cause a loss of offsite power. 
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Under these assumptions, if one unit faces any of the design events, the 
remaining units will not face any event worse than a normal turbine trip with 
loss of offsite power. Designers should determine whether this assumption 
continues to apply as detailed design progresses. The designers should consider 
having the normal plant operating staff take non-regulatory actions to restore 
power in each of these cases, followed by bringing appropriate units back on 
line. 
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6. IRIS EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES 
Table 2 listed the current AP1000 Simulator Emergency Operation Procedures 
and provided a preliminary summary of how they might apply to IRIS. The next 
step was to examine these procedures in detail. We looked at each of the 
corresponding AP1000 procedures and suggested modifications that might make 
them apply to IRIS. Figure 2 through Figure 36 summarize the results, with 
Figure 1 providing a legend. We retained the AP1000 numbering scheme for 
procedures as a convenience, but used our own numbering scheme for Critical 
Safety Function Status Trees. 
An emergency condition begins whenever a reactor trip condition, reactor trip, or 
S signal condition occurs. At this time, EOP E-0 takes effect. The operator’s first 
responsibility is to verify that the reactor is tripped; if not, then the plant is in a 
beyond design basis condition (Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM) and 
procedure FR-S1 (Figure 11) applies. If the reactor tripped, then the operators 
begin monitoring the Critical Safety Function Status Trees. The AP1000 
Simulator has trees for subcriticality (CSF 1, Figure 10), core cooling (CSF-2, 
Figure 13), heat sink (CSF-3, Figure 17), reactor coolant system integrity (CSF-4, 
Figure 20), containment (CSF-5, Figure 23), reactor coolant system inventory 
(CSF-6, Figure 28), emergency recirculation (does not apply to IRIS), and 
radiation (covered by other procedures). The Critical Safety Function Status 
Trees guide the operator to take specific actions when certain prioritized adverse 
conditions occur. The trees operate concurrently; meanwhile, EOP E-0 guides 
the operator through a systematic sequence of assessments and verifications 
that lead to identifying the probable event and the appropriate procedures for 
responding to that event. 
The procedures outlined in Figure 2 through Figure 36 are preliminary and 
undoubtedly will require significant modification as the IRIS design evolves, as 
accident analyses continue, and especially when an IRIS simulator becomes 
available for human factors testing. Two defects are readily apparent: the 
procedures are too abstract and too ambiguous for implementation in a 
computerized procedure system. To a large degree, this reflects the current state 
of the IRIS design. Computer implementation will require identifying specific 
signals and thresholds for each decision in the process, and identifying failure 
(i.e., response not obtained) actions for every step. 
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Entry or termination point
Action with one outcome
Action with multiple possible outcomes (e.g., a decision).
For “YES”/”NO” decisions, “YES” leaves on the right and “NO”
leaves on the bottom.
For “Success”/”Failure” actions, “Success” leaves on the right




Shorthand for logic shown at right:
The verified branch leaves on the
right and the RNO branch leaves on
the bottom. Omitting the RNO branch














A Round circles A and B are on-page
connectors.
Home plate  pentagon is an off-page
connector.
In Critical Safety Function Status
Trees, A leaves page in a “RED”
condition and B leaves in an
“ORANGE” condition (even though
the orange arrow hits a red line).
Legend
 
Figure 1: Legend 
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ENTRY
CONDITIONS
1. Any reactor trip condition
2. Reactor trip has occurred
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This procedure provides instructions to verify proper
response of the automatic protection systems following
manual or automatic actuation of a reactor trip or safety


















Figure 2: E-0, Reactor Trip or S Signal 
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E-0
Rx
E-1: Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant


















































This procedure provides instructions to recover




















































Figure 3: E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant 
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This procedure provides instructions to identify








Figure 4: E-2, Faulted SG Isolation 
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ECA-1.1: Loss of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment

















This procedure provides instructions to





Figure 5: ECA-1.1, Loss of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment 
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E-0 Rx
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This procedure provides instructions to stabilize and control








Figure 6: ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response 
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ES-0.1
Rx
ES-0.2: Natural Circulation Cooldown
Verify
Conditions Permit























This procedure provides instructions to perform a natural circulation RCS
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Figure 7: ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown 
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ES-1.1: Terminate  Engineered Safeguards
This procedure provides instructions to terminate
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Figure 8: ES-1.1, Terminate  Engineered Safeguards 
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This procedure provides instructions to cool down and depressurize the RCS
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Figure 9: ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization 
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Figure 10: CSF-1, Subcriticality Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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E-0 Rx
FR-S1: Anticipated Transients Without SCRAM
This procedure provides instructions to add negative reactivity to a





















































Figure 11: FR-S1, Anticipated Transients Without SCRAM 
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FR-S2: Loss of Core Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions to restore























Figure 12: FR-S2, Loss of Core Shutdown 
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Figure 13: CSF-2, Core Cooling Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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FR-C.1: Response to Inadequate Core Cooling


















Figure 14: FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling 
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FR-C.2: Response to Degraded Core Cooling
This procedure provides instructions



































Figure 15: FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling 
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FR-C.3: Response to Saturated Core Cooling
This procedure provides instructions

























Figure 16: FR-C.3, Response to Saturated Core Cooling 
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Figure 17: CSF-3, Heat Sink Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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FR-H.1: Response to Loss of Heat Sink
This procedure provides instructions to respond
























































Figure 18: FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink 
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FR-H.3: Response to Excessive Feedwater
This procedure provides instructions to respond to a steam generator high-




















Figure 19: FR-H.3, Response to Excessive Feedwater 
Revision 3  53 
 
Electronically approved records are authenticated in the Electronic Document Management System 


































Figure 20: CSF-4, Integrity Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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CSF4:
Integrity
FR-P.1: Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions
This procedure provides instructions to avoid, or limit, thermal shock or pressurized thermal




























































Do Not Cool RCS
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Figure 21: FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions 
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CSF4:
Integrity
FR-P.2: Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions
This procedure provides instructions to respond to a limited overcooling






































Figure 22: FR-P.2, Response to Anticipated Pressurized Thermal Shock Conditions 
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Near Design
Pressure













































Figure 23: CSF-5, Containment Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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CSF5:
Cont
FR-Z.1: Response to High Containment Pressure
This procedure provides instructions to

























Figure 24: FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure 
CSF5:
Cont
FR-Z.2: Response to Containment Flooding
This procedure provides instructions













Step in Effect  
Figure 25: FR-Z.2, Response to Containment Flooding 
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CSF5:
Cont
FR-Z.3: Response to High Containment Radiation
This procedure provides instructions to




















Figure 26: FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation 
CSF5:
Cont
FR-Z.4: Response to Low Containment Pressure
This procedure provides instructions to








on Specific Design  
Figure 27: FR-Z.4, Response to Low Containment Pressure 
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Figure 28: CSF-6, Inventory Critical Safety Function Status Tree 
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FR-I.1: Response to High Pressurizer Level
This procedure provides instructions
to respond to a high pressurizer level.
 
Figure 29: FR-I.1, Response to High Pressurizer Level 
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FR-I.2: Response to Low Pressurizer Level
This procedure provides instructions


































Figure 30: FR-I.2, Response to Low Pressurizer Level 
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SDP-1: Response to Loss of RCS Inventory During Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions to maintain core cooling and protecting the








































































Figure 31: SDP-1, Response to Loss of RCS Inventory During Shutdown 
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SDP-2: Response to Loss of Residual Heat Removal During Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions for maintaining core cooling and protecting






























































Figure 32: SDP-2, Response to Loss of Residual Heat Removal During Shutdown 
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SDP-3: Response to High Containment Radiation During Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions to

















Figure 33: SDP-3, Response to High Containment Radiation During Shutdown 
SDP-4: Response to Increasing Nuclear Flux During Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions to respond






























Figure 34: SDP-4, Response to Increasing Nuclear Flux During Shutdown 
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SDP-5: Response to Cold Overpressure During Shut
This procedure provides instructions to 









To Tech Spec Limits
Using Aux. Apray
Reduce Pressure











To Tech Spec Limits












Figure 35: SDP-5, Response to Cold Overpressure During Shutdown 
 
 
SDP-6: Response to Unexpected RCS Temperature Changes During Shutdown
This procedure provides instructions to respond


















Figure 36: SDP-6, Response to Unexpected RCS Temperature Changes During Shutdown 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This report focused the main features of the EPGs and the control room for 
IPSRs, with particular emphasis on identifying differences and similarities with 
existing PWRs. In particular, we established the following: 
1. The traditional accident categories defined in Reference 5 seem 
adequate for IRIS. They would probably serve for other IPSRs as 
well, but the IPSR designers should confirm this. 
2. Although the accident categories listed in Reference 5 may serve for 
IRIS and other IPSRs, the specific accident lists must address the 
particular characteristics of individual plant designs. The IRIS 
design eliminates several accidents and reduces the consequences 
of several others. 
3. We looked at the AP1000 ERG development process to determine 
whether we could use it for IRIS. This process was evolutionary one 
rather than a revolutionary in the sense that the AP1000 ERGs 
relied heavily on those developed for the reference plant. We 
demonstrated that we can use the AP1000 ERGs as a starting point 
for developing IRIS ERGs; however, the design differences naturally 
led to ERG differences. In particular, the IRIS Safety-By-Design™ 
approach eliminated the need for several procedures that would be 
required for the AP1000 and older type plants. 
4. We assume that first IRIS units will use a distributed digital system 
networked to the control room, and that the control room will 
feature smart workstations. Existing technology would allow 
automating operations to a much greater extent than envisioned for 
AP1000. The decisions to automate particular actions would 
normally come from economic considerations rather than 
technological limitations. 
5. Normal and emergency operating procedures must reflect the plant 
design (including multiple units on one site), the size of the site 
operating staff, and the degree of I&C automation. Traditionally, 
each reactor has its own operating staff, in part because of the 
limitations of traditional hard-wired controls. Modern I&C 
technology removes the technological constraints that lead to 
dedicated control rooms and operating staffs for each unit, so 
sharing these becomes technologically feasible. 
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6. Allowing one control room operating staff to control multiple IRIS 
units introduces the possibility that they would have to deal with 
simultaneous emergencies, but passive protections systems that do 
not require operator actions simplify the staff’s response to 
simultaneous events. Designers should define the credible limits for 
simultaneous emergencies and design the plant and I&C systems 
to maintain acceptable operating staff workloads in all cases. 
7. We developed EPGs for IRIS, using the AP1000 EPGs as a starting 
point. These established the major sequences for operator actions7. 
8. Current computer technology provides an excellent base for 
designing advanced control rooms, and it is difficult to see 
disadvantages to extending the current advanced control room 
design philosophy to IRIS. 
Although there will be considerable work involved in translating these ideas into 
detailed designs, we foresee no conceptual difficulties in applying these concepts 
to IRIS or other IPSRs. 
                                       
7 The current state of the IRIS design does not allow including specific component tag numbers 
in the procedures. 
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